2 July 1974

MEMORANDUM	FOR:	Acting	Deputy	Director	for	Intelligence
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SUBJECT : Declassification of the FBIS TRENDS

1. I have reviewed ______ memorandum, as you requested. I have also made a trip to FBIS, to discuss this matter and to get a general briefing about their academic relations program.

2. To get right to the point, I suggest that the TRENDS should always be unclassified. The sources and methods criteria which the DCI seeks to apply are not really at issue in the case of the TRENDS, even granting that they include analysis based upon communications to which we do not subscribe. The readers of TRENDS have no knowledge of our subscriptions, and probably would not care. The press services quoted would probably be glad for the free publicity—

3. I found no one at FBIS who believed that TRENDS should remain classified for as long as two years—the present plan. The worry begins when one approaches near-real-time release. I know that FBIS intends to propose declassification after six months. In my view, if the two year rule fails, then almost any

other rule is open to question.

4. Since the sources of the material in the TRENDS are unclassified, it seems to me of questionable legality to classify them for any period--unless the mind of the analyst is considered a classified tool. This is a hard hypothesis to rationalize under other circumstances, such as articles written for professional journals or talks given to uncleared audiences. They are no less "official" utterances than the TRENDS. Then why apply an arbitrary standard to the TRENDS alone?

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- 5. On the positive side, there is a great deal to be gained by making available to the public some Agency publication such as TRENDS. It would be received well by interested subscribers because it is done well. In some cases it would improve the quality of public understanding and discussion of key issues. It would be an invaluable research aid for the academic community, and within a time frame which would maximize its usefulness. It would better inform scholars and researchers with whom the government deals, thereby improving the quality of our consultations.
- 6. It seems to me that the two remaining problems—the drawing of attention to the FBIS/CIA relationship—can also be disposed of, if it is a serious concern. Why not publish TRENDS under a CIA cover page, rather than within FBIS covers? And have the analysts who write an article for TRENDS identify themselves in a by—line. Then there could be no doubt that it was at one and the same time an Agency "rather than" an FBIS publication, and also the product of a few people rather than the ultimate word of the whole government.
- 7. We can all agree in the abstract that there is too much secrecy in government. We need to draw some lines that show how seriously we view the problem. The TRENDS seem to me to offer a good opportunity to share with the public some of the intelligence which it pays for, without doing any damage to the concept of necessary secrecy.

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COORDINATOR FOR ACADEMIC RELATIONS

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18 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

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SUBJECT : Declassification of the FBIS TRENDS

1. This memorandum responds to your request for a statement of the FBIS position regarding _______ recommendation that the FBIS TRENDS in Communist Propaganda and associated analytical publications be declassified. It notes the principal arguments for and against such declassification, sets out our alternatives and in paragraph 7 recommends that this question be deferred to give FBIS more time to consider the full implications of a declassified or FOUO product.

2. FBIS publications involving analysis of communist propaganda have normally been classified Confidential for many years in keeping with the tradition that intelligence analysis by definition was classified at least Confidential in order to protect Agency information and its substantive positions from foreign view. This classification was reviewed in 1972 following promulgation of Executive Order 11652 and reconfirmed except that it was decided to declassify the weekly TRENDS automatically after two years.

A declassified FBIS TRENDS

would be one of the few USG periodicals available to the public highlighting and drawing inferences regarding political developments in
the communist world. It could be seen as representing the official
view. FBIS analytical publications are based only on radio and
published sources. Other sources might well indicate that our view
is distorted or wrong, but analysis based on these other sources would
not be available outside the Government. FBIS analytical publications
reflect intelligence interests on a very current basis since our analysts
are in close contact with the Soviet and Chinese watching community and
since their analysis is based on the full breadth of radio and press
sources as reported hourly by our overseas bureaus. Declassified
analytical publications could provoke communist officialdom, further
disquiet foreign governments hosting FBIS operations, lead to harrassment of our small analytical staff and involve FBIS and possibly the

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Agency in public controversy. Thus declassified publications would limit our sources, place a strong inhibition on substantive inferences and bring into question the close contacts between our analysts and the all-source community further isolating FBIS from the mainstream of intelligence production.

4. However, the arguments for declassification are also strong. FBIS analytical methods and most of its radio and press sources are not classified. All or part of these publications have been made available since 1969.

Excerpts, such as the Indo-China highlights, have been wire filed FOUO to wire service subscribers and to a large number of diplomatic and military posts abroad. Agency publication would respond to the DCI's interest in making as much Agency information available to the public as possible using FBIS as one bridge for this purpose. Current analysis of communist propaganda would be a boon to Soviet and China watchers in and out of the Government. It would stimulate interest in this field, insure those outside the Government were better informed and provide a common ground for debate across Government/non-Government lines. Declassification would undoubtedly respond to the widely and strongly felt need of many people including FBIS propaganda analysts themselves for greater openness and a broader competition of ideas.

- 5. We are faced with the following possibilities: we can continue present arrangements with automatic declassification but no advertisement at the end of two years, shorten the period for automatic declassification, declassify the book altogether or use an FOUO dissemination control with or without an automatic decontrol after a specified period. We can advertise the declassified or decontrolled book and place it on public sale through NTIS. I believe we could shorten the automatic declassification to six months or a year without seriously contradicting the reasons for classification. FOUO would not get these publications outside the Government and would in fact be more restrictive in that regard than the present automatic declassification at the end of two years.
- 6. I see our choice fundamentally as between on the one hand an unhibited propaganda analysis program able to tap all broadcast and published sources and carried out in close concert with OCI, OPR, INR and the NSC Staff and on the other hand a more limited and isolated effort ever conscious of an outside readership including the foreign interests concerned. Many of the practical problems of declassification noted above can be overcome but I think it means quite a different FBIS analytical product. Are the changes required by declassification worth the gains of a broader public readership?

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7. If you agree, I would like to review this question with a members of the FBIS analytical staff and especially with an architect and longtime practitioner of the propaganda analysis art who will be primarily responsible for the product whichever was		STAT
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2 July.	\	STAT
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Director	_ \	
Foreign Broadcast Information Service	ce	

Wednesday, 14 August 1974 1500 hours

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Meeting with Re: Declassification of FBIS Trends

Tile FB15

MEMORANDUM FOR: PVW

A very persuasive argument by

for declassifying the FBIS TRENDS.

What do want to do?

But places form 10-101

AUG 54 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101

HICH MAY BE USED.

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STAT	MEMORANDUM FOR:	
	Gary	
	Would appreciate your thoughts on the attached.	
STAT	Ed Proctor	
	18 June 1974 (DATE)	
	FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101	(47

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